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FEATURE
ARTICLE
Clash of the Federal Titans:
The Federal Arbitration Act v. the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Will the Consumer Win or Lose?
by Katherine R. Guerin
Once upon a time, as the story goes, one party could contract
with another party face to face for a sale of goods or services, and
agree together on the terms for payment and delivery. Each party
would pay or perform as the agreement indicated. If there was a
disagreement, the parties could go to court and resolve their dis-
pute. Regrettably, this short fairy tale is just that, a tale of long ago
when it comes to consumer contracts of today.
The present day purchasing consumer is not contracting at
all but is subject to a myriad of terms and conditions in confusing
legal jargon. The seller's boilerplate language becomes more like
boilerplate armor, skillfully crafted by legal counsel. In contrast,
the consumer has no negotiation rights and consequently, has no
choice-the "take it or leave it" theory-but to sign "on the dotted
line" and hope to be satisfied with the product.
If the consumer can somehow muddle through such an
agreement, one of the clauses often discovered is an arbitration
clause. Generally, an arbitration clause requires and binds the
consumer to arbitrate any problems that may arise under the trans-
action. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), which
governs consumer warranty transactions, has a provision for dis-
pute resolutions.' Arbitration clauses, which are governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act2 ("FAA"), are different from such warranty
dispute resolution mechanisms. Under the MMWA, informal dis-
pute resolutions usually involve a panel that considers the dispute
according to the guidelines set forth in the MMWA. The dispute
resolution is not binding on the consumer and may not even be
binding on the manufacturer.3
Alternatively, binding arbitration is usually found in the
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purchase contract and is based on the parties' agreement, not im-
posed by law. Federal or state law will complete the arbitration
agreement on procedures not clearly outlined in the agreement. An
arbitral panel consisting of three arbitrators, or a single arbitrator
chosen by the parties, issues a binding decision regarding the
dispute that is enforceable in court.4
The perspective from which arbitration characteristics are
viewed colors its evaluation. Different considerations are impor-
tant in determining whether society should encourage the use of
arbitration rather than court proceedings. Of primary importance
is the motivation and bargaining position of the parties. If the
course of dealing is between two sophisticated parties, who wish to
maintain a commercial relationship, the emphasis on the resolution
of their dispute is vastly different from a consumer in dispute over
a contract with a manufacturer.
This paper focuses on one of the most recent problematic
areas to surface in consumer protection law; that is, whether arbi-
tration clauses under the FAA preclude the MMWA in consumer
contracts. First, this article will briefly describe the clash between
the FAA and the MMWA. Second, this article will discuss the FAA,
its history and provisions. Third, it will contrast the MMWA, and
its history and provisions. Fourth, it will examine the arguments
for, and against, arbitration in consumer contracts and their public
policy. Fifth, it will discuss in depth recent court clashes of the FAA
and MMWA. Finally, it will comment on the possible solutions to
the conflict between the two statutes in consumer contracts.
I. THE CLASH OF THE "TITANS"
The crux of the matter is the clash between the binding
provisions of an arbitration clause enforceable under the FAA and
the prohibition of arbitration under the MMWA in consumer con-
tracts. Since both of these "Federal Titans" have a valuable role to
play in commercial transactions, the issue presented is which Act
should override the other in cases involving consumer transactions.
After serious judicial analysis, the answer appears to rest on Con-
gressional intent and public policy.
The Federal Trade Commission Rule 703 ("FFC Rule 703")
under the MMWA specifies that manufacturers and dealers cannot
include binding arbitration provision in their warranties or related
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documents whenever they offer a written warranty.' The ban on
binding arbitration applies to all sales of new consumer products,
and some used products.6 According to one commentary, FTC Rule
703 applies to any informal dispute settlement procedure which is
incorporated into the terms of a written warranty and therefore
regulates not only non-binding informal dispute resolution mecha-
nisms but also binding arbitration provision incorporated into the
terms of a written warranty.7 FTC Rule 703 also states that the
informal dispute settlement procedure cannot be legally binding on
any person.8 Consumers have to be informed that they can pursue
legal remedies if they are dissatisfied with the dispute resolution.9
One commentator concluded that "While the agency commentary
accompanying the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act regulations
observes that a warrantor may offer consumers the option of bind-
ing arbitration, once a dispute has arisen, the regulations prohibit
warrantors from mandating binding arbitration prior to the occur-
rence of the dispute."'1
Alternatively, manufacturers and dealers have attempted to
enforce arbitration clauses in consumer contracts under the Federal
Arbitration Act, thereby precluding any court proceedings. These
clauses bind the consumer to arbitration and are without recourse
in the courts.
II. ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'
A. Arbitration Mechanics
Before discussing the actual provisions of the FAA, an over-
view of the arbitration process may prove helpful. Arbitration is an
alternative to litigation proceedings in court. In arbitration, the
parties agree in their contract to submit any subsequent disputes
arising from the transaction to an arbitrator or arbitral panel of
three. The arbitration contract provision may or may not specify
mechanics such as forum, rules or procedures. If the parties do
agree on such terms and a dispute subsequently arises, the arbitra-
tion clause in the contract is enforceable. In cases where the parties
have not made provisions for forum and rules prior to the dispute,
one of several arbitration commissions can be elected for use. The
commission rules most often used in the United States are the
International Commerce Commission ("ICC"), American Arbitra-
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tion Association and United Nation Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules. 2
The contract dispute is submitted to the arbitrator or arbitral
panel with or without legal counsel for either party. The arbitrator
or arbitral panel is chosen by agreement of the parties. In the case
of a single arbitrator, each side must agree on the person. If an
arbitral panel is used, then each side usually elects one person, with
both parties agreeing to a third. The arbitrator or panel is generally
not composed of judges or lawyers, but experienced business
persons in the field of the commercial transactions who are also
familiar with dispute resolutions.
After limited discovery, each side is allowed to present
arguments before the arbitrator. After consideration of the issues,
the arbitrator resolves the dispute in favor of one of the parties.
The arbitration decision is usually binding, but may be appealed on
causes of action at law including fraud, duress, unconscionability,
unfairness of the arbitral forum or bias of the arbitrator or arbitral
panel.
Further, unless a party is willing to pay for a court reporter,
the arbitration forum is private and without a record of the pro-
ceedings. The arbitrator's decision report is submitted only to the
parties and is not published. The privacy gained from an arbitra-
tion decision is appealing to commercial parties who may prefer to
have the decision and damages unknown to their other commercial
customers.
Originally, arbitration was only recognized as an alternative
dispute resolution for sophisticated commercial contract parties
with solid business background, where an inexpensive, speedy
resolution was more important than formalities. Often, goods were
sitting on a dock awaiting the outcome of the arbitration proceed-
ings. Additionally, the parties might have ongoing commercial
transactions with one another and a bitter legal suit would harm
further commercial dealings. However, over the years arbitration
has become more and more frequent and acceptable.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
Congress enacted the FAA in 192513 in an effort to dispel
judiciary hostility towards arbitration based on the view that it was
a displacement of the judiciary function.14 The FAA gave arbitra-
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tion clauses an equal footing with other contract clauses. The law
provides that a written provision in a commercial contract for the
settlement of disputes by arbitration is valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except for revocation based in law or equity.15 The
FAA directed Courts to either stay litigation proceedings pending
completion of arbitration or compel the parties to arbitrate. 6
Initially, courts resisted the FAA. In Wilko v. Swan, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the right to select a judicial forum cannot
validly be waived. Furthermore, the Court opined that an agree-
ment to arbitrate future controversies between securities brokers
and buyers constituted a "stipulation" which also violated and was
nullified by section 14 of the Securities Act. 7 The Court stated in
dicta that arbitration proceedings were not suited to cases requiring
subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
violator. 8
However, in the 1980's the Supreme Court took a strong pro-
arbitration approach starting with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth.9 In Mitsubishi, the Court validated an agree-
ment to arbitrate antitrust claims when the agreement arose from
international transactions.2" In 1989, after several other pro-arbitra-
tion cases, the Supreme Court overruled Wilko on similar facts in
Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.2 In Shearson,
the Court opined that the Wilko Court's characterization of the
arbitration process was pervaded by what Judge Jerome Frank
called "the old judicial hostility to arbitration" and noted that such
views had been steadily eroding over the years. 22 Further, the
Court determined that once the outmoded presumption of disfa-
voring arbitration proceedings is set aside, it becomes clear that the
right to select the judicial forum is a not essential feature of the
Securities Act.23 The Court held that the strong language of the
Arbitration Act declared that arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 24 The Court
found that arbitration would only be barred on a showing that
there existed an inherent conflict between arbitration and a federal
statute's purpose.25
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
FAA applies even if the plaintiff wants to litigate in state court. In
determining whether to stay proceedings or compel arbitration, the
court must first decide: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate,
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and (2) whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the
asserted claims.26 Accordingly, the courts must construe the inten-
tions of the parties generously as to the issues of arbitration. 27 This
provision further preempts inconsistent state laws as the state
courts are required to follow the FAA. State statutory attempts that
are inconsistent with the FAA are preempted, 28 as long as the activ-
ity involves interstate commerce. 29
Challenges to the validity of the contract as a whole are
issues for the factfinder-arbitrator.30 Challenges to the arbitration
clause itself on the grounds of fraud, mistake, duress, or unconscio-
nability are left for the courts to decide.31 The FAA has removed
the court's ability to analyze the merits of the case when there is an
arbitration clause.32
The FAA's mandatory enforcement of arbitration clauses is
based on the "freedom of the contract" theory; if consenting parties
not under coercion or duress agree to terms in a contract, the par-
ties are forced to abide by the acknowledged terms. Considering
that the arbitration clause was part of the bargain, the court gener-
ally deems such a unilateral request of avoidance of a term as
inappropriate.
Courts now favor arbitration agreements as a matter of
public policy and some have extended the national pro-arbitration
policy to include consumer contracts. However, courts favor arbi-
tration in consumer contracts only when there is a clear factual
record without the issues concerning the validity, revocability and
enforceability of the contract as a whole.33 Perhaps the courts'
more lenient attitude towards arbitration may be the result of the
pressure they face from clogged court schedules and backed-up
dockets.
III. THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT 34
Enacted in 1974, Congress designed the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA") 35 to prevent deception by promoting
consumer understanding, and insuring basic protection for consum-
ers purchasing consumer products with written warranties. 3 Con-
sumers had been inundated with complex problems concerning
UCC warranties; complex language that rendered warranty terms
incomprehensible, warranties that appeared to give more protection
than they actually did (by provided express warranties combined
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with disclaimers of all implied warranties and severe limitations of
remedies), and lack of meaningful access to the courts.37 The
MMWA also intended to make it easier for consumers to obtain
court enforcement of a warranty by providing legal fees to prevail-
ing consumer plaintiffs. Additionally, Congress hoped to stimulate
manufacturers' production of more reliable products by requiring
clear disclosure of product warranties.38 Although the legislative
history on the MMWA is scant, the Federal Trade Commission Rules
does contain a section entitled "Interpretations of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act," which covers basic issues of the MMWA.39
The MMWA applies only to "consumer products" manufac-
tured after July 4, 1975 and is focused on consumer warranties.0
The MMWA was intended to add special legal safeguards appli-
cable to consumer warranties that are not necessary for commercial
business transactions, hence the limited scope to consumers.4 The
MMWA does not require warranties to be given, nor does it pre-
scribe the duration of a warranty.42 It takes a "free market ap-
proach," and relies on the forces of competition, nourished by
improved information to consumers, spurring sellers to enhance
warranty terms.43 It provides only that if a manufacturer chooses
to give a written warranty, then disclosures and provisions must be
met.44 The warranty must be written in simple and readily under-
stood language, must be labeled as "full" or "limited," and must be
available prior to the sale.45 The MMWA does not apply to ser-
vices, unless the services are combined with products, such as
"parts and labor. ' 46
Although the MMWA does not do much in the area of sub-
stantive regulation of warranties, it has proved to be very valuable
to consumers.47 A written warranty as defined by the MMWA is
both narrower and broader than the UCC express warranty.4 The
specific jurisdictional requirements of the MMWA must be com-
plied with before a consumer with a warranty problem can invoke
its provisions.49 The jurisdictional requirements are: (1) written
warranties', (2) on consumer products51, (3) which actually cost
the consumer more than a specified amount,5 2 and (4) warranted
consumer product must be distributed in commerce.53
A. Written Warranties
The term "written warranty" is defined narrowly by
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MMWA. A written warranty means either; (1) any written affirma-
tion of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a
consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the
nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that
such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time or (2) any
undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of
a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other reme-
dial action with respect to such product in the event that such
product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of
the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for pur-
poses other than resale of such product.54
In either case, the affirmation to refund, repair or take other
remedial action, as well as the promise of defect free goods must be
part of the basis of the bargain between the supplier and retail
buyer of the warranted product.5 5
The MMWA does not cover any oral warranties.56 Oral
warranties are considered under the Uniform Commercial Code.57
However, the MMWA does cover some express warranties, if they
are written and meet the statutory definition. 8 The question of
third party responsibility for warranties, such as a retailer distribut-
ing a manufacturer's product that contains a warranty is not cov-
ered by the MMWA, unless the retailer "adopted" the warranty. 9
B. Consumer Products
MMWA defines the term "consumer product" to mean any
tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes
(including any such property intended to be attached to or installed
in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or
installed).60 The focus of the definition is an objective approach
relying on "normal use" or common use that is not atypical, and
does not have to be exclusively used as a consumer product.61 If
there is a question as to the use being a normal, common consumer
use and commercial use, the doubts are resolved in favor of classi-
fying the product as a consumer product.62 Furthermore, the
MMWA applies to both new and used consumer products.63
Likewise, under the MMWA a consumer means a buyer
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(other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any
person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of
an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to
the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of
such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable state law to
enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations
of the warranty (or service contract).64 By definition, the MMWA
eliminates the restrictions of vertical and horizontal privity in most
instances."
C. Minimum Price Requirement
Depending on the price of the product, the MMWA grants
either a "full" or "limited" warranty. If the provision requiring
designation of written warranties is "full,"6 6 then it must meet the
Federal minimum standards for warranty set forth in section 10467
of the MMWA. Accordingly, it must be conspicuously designated a
"full (statement of duration) warranty" by the guarantor. 68 If the
provision is "limited, 69 that is, if it does not meet the Federal
minimum standards for warranty set forth in section 104 of the
MMWA, then the guarantor must conspicuously state "limited
warranty." A limited warranty only applies to warranties on con-
sumer products actually costing the consumer more than $10 (ex-
cluding tax) and which are not otherwise designated "full (state-
ment of duration) warranties."7'
A consumer product may be sold with both full and limited
warranties, but only if they are clearly and conspicuously differen-
tiated.71 If a warrantor fails to designate full or limited, the pre-
sumption is for full warranty coverage. 72 If a full warranty is of-
fered, under the MMWA, the warrantor may not disclaim or
modify the implied warranties arising under state law. 73 In addi-
tion, those warrantors offering limited warranties may not disclaim
implied warranties during the term of the limited warranty.74
D. Distributed Within Commerce
Under the MMWA, the term "distributed within commerce"
means sold in commerce, introduced or delivered for introduction
into commerce, or held for sale or distribution after introduction
into commerce.7 5 "Commerce" is defined as trade, traffic, com-
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merce, or transportation that is (A) between a place in a State and
any place outside thereof, or, (B) that affects trade, traffic, com-
merce, or transportation described in subparagraph (A).76 Since the
MMWA covers only those products that are part of interstate com-
merce under the Commerce Clause, 7 theoretically, it does not cover
products manufactured and distributed solely within a single
state.78
E. Liabilities and Damages
Consumer remedies are allowed based on the violation by a
supplier79 , warrantor80 or service contractor.81 The MMWA defines
a "supplier' as any person engaged in the business of making a
consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers. 2 A
"warrantor" is any supplier or other person who gives or offers to
give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an
implied warranty.83 Further, the MMWA's definition for "service
contract" is a contract in writing to perform, over a fixed period of
time or for a specified duration, services relating to the mainte-
nance or repair (or both) of a consumer product.84 The MMWA
extends consumer damage liability for failure of a service contrac-
tor to comply with any obligations found therein.85
Essentially the MMWA covers all entities in the chain of
production and distribution of a consumer product, including the
manufacturer, component supplier, distributor, wholesaler and
retailer.86 A dealer who merely distributes the manufacturer's
written warranty is not liable for breaches of that warranty, but the
dealer may be liable under the manufacturer's written warranty if
the dealer "adopts" it as its own.87
The MMWA authorizes private damage actions not only
when the MMWA is violated but also when a written warranty,
implied warranty, or service contract is breached by failure to
comply with the written warranty, service contract or implied
warranty under state law or any requirement of the MMWA. 88 The
MMWA does not require that the consumer prove substantial
impairment of value of the warranted product.89
A full warranty cannot exclude or limit consequential dam-
ages for breach of any written or implied warranty on a product,
unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the
face of the warranty, and if the product (or component part thereof)
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contains a defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of
attempts by the warrantor to remedy the defects or malfunctions. 90
Nor can a supplier disclaim or modify an implied warranty to the
consumer if there is a written warranty or a service contract entered
into within 90 days of the sale of the product.9' Also, when there is
a written warranty, any disclaimer of the implied warranty is inef-
fective, but the warrantor can limit the duration of the implied
warranty to the same period as the written warranty.92
F. Informal Dispute Resolution Under the MMWA
The MMWA addresses the issues of dispute resolution stat-
ing that Congress declared its policy to encourage warrantors to
establish procedure whereby consumer disputes are fairly and
expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mecha-
nisms.93 The FTC can proscribe any minimum requirements for the
informal dispute settlement procedure under the MMWA. 94
The minimum requirements and procedure for informal
dispute settlements is set forth by the FTC and encompasses all
aspects of a dispute, including the duties of a warrantor, who can
qualify to be a member of the dispute resolution, how the dispute
resolution will be expedited, how records will be kept, audits and
confidentiality.95 Failure on the part of the warrantor to comply
with the informal dispute settlement procedures, will result in the
FTC taking appropriate remedial action. 96 The MMWA requires the
informal dispute information be given within the warranty itself.97
Consumers may not be charged a fee for the use of the informal
dispute resolution mechanism and the mechanism must have
written operating procedures.98 Since the results of the informal
dispute settlement are non-binding on the consumer, the MMWA
would obviously not favor arbitration clauses that are binding on
the consumer.99
IV. FACTORS FAVORING ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS
At the outset, a consumer may find an arbitration clause in
their contract attractive. The speed, lower costs, informality, au-
tonomy and choice of a suitable neutral decision-maker as well as
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privacy, all play a role in evaluating arbitration as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. However, these advantages are only potential
advantages and are realized only when both parties cooperate in
the arbitration process. 100 Several of the attractive features of
arbitration follow.
A. Speed of the Arbitration Process
The arbitration proceeding is conducted quickly; there is no
loss of time waiting for normal litigation procedures including the
complaint and response times mandated procedurally, discovery
process time and the long wait for a court docket hearing date.
Resolution of a dispute may be quickly obtained as soon as an
arbitrator or panel is composed and a brief hearing process has
taken place.
B. Lower Costs of Arbitration
Arbitration appears to be less costly, because the parties do
not need legal counsel, nor are there court costs or filing fees.10 1
Expensive expert witnesses and large legal fees are avoided. If the
parties elect to have legal representation, the legal fees are less than
for a full-blown court trial. The arbitration process is shorter,
therefore the fees for the arbitrator or panel are less than the fees
would be for a lengthy court hearing.
C. Informality of the Dispute Process
Arbitration is also informal, the parties choose an independent
third party to hear the issues and decide who will win. The infor-
mality of the process lends itself supports the benefits of less cost
and speed. Discovery issues are limited and motions are less fre-
quently a part of an arbitration proceeding. The rules of evidence
and civil or criminal procedure are not used. Since most arbitration
decisions have limited review, the time consuming appeals process
is eliminated for the most part.
D. Choice of a Decision-maker
The parties' ability to decide the qualities of a decision-
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maker is valuable for a variety of reasons. A law judge may not
have the background of commercial transactions. A specialized
decision-maker in the field of the commercial transactions may be
in a better position to understand the crux of the dispute. Often, all
that may be needed is an experienced businessperson from the
same industry with familiarity of industry practices. The parties
may want a person who is just fair-minded and not really familiar
with the subject of the dispute. The process is self-correcting; if an
arbitrator is considered unfair, or insensitive, others will not use
that particular person for subsequent disputes. However, critics
have maintained that because an arbitrator has to make acceptable
decisions to remain an arbitrator, the arbitrator's decisions are
compromised.
E. Privacy
A court proceeding is far from private, the decision is an-
nounced to the public, may or may not be reported in the media
and can be published in law reporters. In contrast, an arbitration
proceeding is conducted privately, and the opinion of the arbitrator
may or may not be released to others depending on the agreements
of the parties. Privacy is attractive, especially if damaging informa-
tion would become public knowledge and have an effect on future
sales or negotiations.
V. FACTORS DISFAVORING ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Despite the surface appeal of arbitration as discussed in the
section above, in the consumer transaction context, there can be
significant disadvantages. Consumers argue that arbitration
clauses are unfair, overreaching and a deceptive practice. Some of
the specific arguments follow.
A. Consumer Perception
People assume that they will have their "day in court." An
arbitration clause materially changes the dispute resolution "rules"
that consumers and borrowers are accustomed to and expect.
These resolutions include jury trials, class actions, or statutory
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remedies. From the consumer's point of view it is unreasonable for
a manufacturer or dealer to constrain the consumer's remedy
without negotiation or notice.
B. Consumer Contracts are Contracts of Adhesion
Arbitration is not a fair substitution for litigation because the
consumer may not be aware they gave up their rights under a
contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion has been defined by
the courts as standardized forms prepared by one party which are
offered for rejection or acceptance without opportunity for bargain-
ing and under the circumstances that the second party cannot
obtain the desired product or service except by acquiescing in the
form agreement. 10 2 Most binding arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts are part of adhesion contracts, unlike a bargained-for
commercial contracts, where the arbitration clause may be negoti-
ated and understood by both sides.
At least one court has held that standardized contracts of
adhesion may be denied use of an arbitration clause if the party in
an inferior bargaining position had no meaningful choice in the
purchase.0 3 Generally, the consumer cannot negotiate beyond the
consumer's freedom to buy the product at the price he wants. The
pre-printed clauses are universally applied, there is no personal
negotiation for the clause and most often, the consumer rarely
reads it. Considering that the consumer did not write the contract
nor its provisions, the consumer has unequal bargaining power. 104
C. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial
A binding arbitration agreement that was not knowingly and
voluntarily accepted by the consumer, arguably violates the con-
sumers 7th Amendment right to a jury trial for claims brought
under common law in federal courts. The waiver of the right to a
jury trial by an arbitration clause also implicates some 14th Amend-
ment Due Process problems.10 6
D. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
As one commentator opined, "It is simply wrong to rest
waiver of a constitutional right on the assumption that a consumer
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would ... read in detail all of the documents enclosed with a new
computer..." 107
Arbitration clauses are obscured in fine print, buried within
the sale contract and employ dense, contradictory language with
inconsistent terms. Even if the consumer were to read the fine
print, the question follows, would the average consumer under-
stand the provisions? Consumer advocates answer definitively no.
Unsophisticated consumers do not have the training of attorneys.
Admittedly, most lawyers cannot even understand the legalese
doublespeak that enshrouds consumer contracts. In sum, there is
no notice to the consumer of the clause. If the consumer has no
notice of the provisions of the contract, the consumer cannot be
held to have made an "informed decision," or at the very least, to
have evaluated the arbitration clause.
Some warrantors try to avoid the notice issue with consumers
by using a vendor as a "strawman." A typical "strawman" scenario
is when a consumer purchases a product and the manufacturer
includes the warranty in the packaging without any notice to the
consumer, and subsequently the vendor has the duty to inform the
consumer of the warranty at the cashier counter. 108 Again, this
tactic severely impairs consumer notice.
In Hill v. Gateway, the Seventh Circuit recently considered the
issue of notice and arbitration clauses.' °9 In Gateway, the court held
that warranty terms sent in a computer packaging box, which
stated that the terms governed the sale between the consumer-
buyer and manufacturer unless the computer was returned within
30 days, were binding on the consumer-buyer.110
The consumer-buyer in Gateway, who had kept the computer
more than 30 days, filed suit in federal district court against Gate-
way arguing inter alia, RICO charges and lack of notice of being
bound to arbitrate."' Gateway immediately appealed under the
Federal Arbitration Act." 2 In compelling the consumer/buyer to
submit to arbitration, Judge Easterbrook found that following the
Federal Arbitration Act, an agreement to arbitrate must be enforced
"1save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract." 113
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found Carr v. CIGNA
Securities and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg instructive in binding the
Hills to the arguably unassented to arbitration clause."4 The Gate-
way court also followed the reasoning of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
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which held that in software sales, the terms inside the software box
bind the consumer who uses the software after the opportunity to
read the terms and to reject the by returning the product."'
After determining that the consumer was bound to arbitra-
tion, the Gateway court discussed three ways the consumer-buyer
could have protected themselves. 116 First, the consumer can ask the
vendor to send a copy of the warranty and services before they
decide to buy.11 7 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires firms
to distribute their warranty terms on request."8 Second, buyers can
consult public sources such as computer magazines or the Web sites
of vendors that may contain this information. 19 Third, the buyer
may inspect the documents after the product's delivery.2 The
Gateway court found that since the consumer/buyer chose the third
option and had kept the computer more than 30 days, they had
accepted Gateway's offer that included the arbitration clause.2 1
What kind of real notice were the consumers in Gateway
given? And, why should the manufacturer be allowed to shift the
burden of notice to the buyer to search for the existence of an arbi-
tration clause; or after the sale, expect the consumer to return the
item to avoid either the clause or the arbitration costs, as Gateway
now dictates. 2 2 An apt illustration of Gateway's shortcomings in
light of consumer realities is the Holiday shopping season. Imagine
this burden at Christmas for the consumer-parent, as to toy warran-
ties, when all the packages are opened and destroyed, and the
"little consumer child" does not want the toy returned? Did the
consumer parent have the opportunity during the shopping season
to "discover" all the manufacturers' warranties while chasing down
crowded aisles trying to find this year's latest "Tickle Me, Elmo"?123
E. Arbitration Costs
Advocates of arbitration argue that the costs incurred are far
less than litigation. Pro-consumer advocates respond that arbitra-
tion costs have skyrocketed in the past few years and that often
they are as expensive as a full court proceeding. 24 Courts are
subsidized and arbitration forums are not. Arbitration proceedings
are charged by the day, and arbitrators receive hourly wages.2 5
The arbitral forum may require advance payments to cover costs
that may or may not be recouped .126 Arbitration proceedings can be
terminated for failure to pay fees and charged in full.'27 Attorney
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fees are only recoverable if it is stated in the contract, unlike statu-
tory remedy provisions that allow for attorney fees.128 When
attorney fees are not recoverable, it is a deterrent to the consumer
and discourages arbitration.
F. Arbitrators are not Judges
Another criticism of arbitration is that by its nature, arbitra-
tors and the selection of arbitrators grants the warrantor an advan-
tage. The warrantor most often selects the arbitrator. Generally, the
arbitrator is not a judge, must less an attorney, but often is a
businessperson skilled in the field or business of the warrantor-
manufacturer. At the very least this poses the question of bias on
the part of the arbitrator for the business entity Fairness, which is
supposed to be at the center of the dispute resolution, then becomes
a concern. Further, the arbitrator may not be neutral because the
warrantor, who may be a repeat customer, chooses the arbitrator.
The arbitrator in pursuit of repeat business could be biased for the
warrantor.
G. Procedural Problems and Inequities
Discovery in arbitration is limited. The American Arbitra-
tion Association rules provide for no discovery beyond the ex-
change of exhibits two business days before the hearing.129 Con-
sumers who need to show a pattern of conduct for their claim will
be particularly damaged. Lack of information and knowledge from
limited discovery may hurt the average consumer's claims.
In addition, limited discovery inhibits the consumer's ability
to assert other claims under statutory provisions such as the Truth
in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair
Credit Billing Act, particularly when the consumer wants to show a
pattern of conduct to bolster fraud and Consumer Protection Act
claims. Each of these consumer action rights is based on docu-
ments that may or may not be in the hands of the manufacturer-
warrantor, such as disclosure statements, notes, and security instru-
ments. Often, the actions will require a supeona duces tecum, with
which the consumer cannot comply because they do not have
access to the needed documents. In a formal discovery process, the
consumer is able to obtain documents and evidence from the op-
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posing party. In effect, the limited discovery could hurt the con-
sumers other statutory rights through the consumer's inability to
adequately prepare.
Likewise, the arbitration clause may include a choice of
forum and choice of law statement.130 These may bind the con-
sumer to arbitrating in an expensive distant state under laws gov-
erning that jurisdiction. The consumer has waived his procedural
rights to litigate in his own state with his own laws. The practical
result of a choice of law clause is that the expense of arbitrating in a
distant state may be a deterrent for the consumer to arbitrate at all.
Finally, the appealablity of an arbitral result is limited. 131
The appellant must show fraud, corruption, or "evident partiality"
in the proceeding or a "manifest disregard" for the law.132
H. Waiver of Economic Alternatives
Under an arbitration clause, the consumer unknowingly has
waived his rights to other forms of recovery. In addition to the
statutory alternatives that may be options for the consumer, the
consumer has lost his right to a class action against the warranty.
The consumer also would not be able to recover any punitive
damages, if they applied.
I. Privacy
Arbitration advocates hold up privacy as an important
attribute of arbitration. Arbitration proceedings are not reported,
unless one party pays for a court reporter.133 The arbitral decisions
are not public knowledge and usually are given only to the par-
ties. T' For the consumer, privacy, which is in other terms "lack of
public access," in a dispute resolution proceeding is the death knell
of consumer protection. If proceedings are closed without public
knowledge or attendance, information vital to other consumers is
unavailable. Court proceedings are open and for the most part, are
available to the public and media to disseminate information. In
fact, one of the reasons punitive damages are allowed in specific
contexts, is to deter undesirable conduct. If other consumers are
not made aware of a problem due to the secrecy of a closed pro-
ceeding, then the warrantor/manufacturer has no reason or deter-
rent to change the problem.
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J. Lack of Mutuality
Arguments have been made against arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts based on lack of mutuality both in the obliga-
tion of the parties and for the remedy of the parties. Lack of mutual-
ity in the obligations of the parties refers to the lack of consideration
given in exchange for the consumer's waiver of rights. Lack of
mutuality in the remedy of the parties refers to the case where the
consumer will be compelled by the contract to arbitrate while the
manufacturer will have the election of arbitration, a judicial forum
or a mixed proceeding of both arbitration and litigation depending
on different provisions in the contract.
Courts have found both of these lack of mutuality arguments
compelling, especially lack of mutuality in the remedy where the
remedy options are clearly unequal and unfairly distributed. One
court found that under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section
79 if there was adequate consideration given, then mutuality of
obligation was not an additional element.'35 Another court found
that arbitration agreements do not need mutuality of remedy be-
cause contracts do not require mutuality of remedy. 36 There is no
majority in the circuits and some courts have held that both lack of
mutuality and remedy will void the arbitration clause, while others
have held that one or the other present will void the clause.37
VI. CASE LAW CONSIDERING THE VALIDITY OF
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CLAUSES
In general, several methods have been employed by con-
sumers to challenge arbitration in consumer contracts in the courts.
Methods include: (1) the arbitration clause does not apply; (2) the
Federal Arbitration Act does not apply; and (3) the clause is invalid
because it is unconscionable, fraud in factum, lack of mutuality or
against public policy.38  The burden of proof rests on the party
seeking to compel arbitration. That party must show knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver by the other party.
A. The Arbitration Clause Does Not Apply
The arguments used are those typical of the public policy argu-
ments previously discussed.
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B. The Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Apply.139
To apply the FAA to consumer contracts would contravene
public policy, as the FAA applies to merchants with equal bargain-
ing powers. With consumers, there is a marked imbalance of so-
phistication, knowledge and financial resources; therefore, consum-
ers should not be compelled to arbitrate. Additionally, critics argue
that if the consumer is compelled to arbitrate, he has unknowingly
lost alternate forms of remedy.14°
C. Contract Theories
First, an arbitration clause may be deemed invalid because it
is unconscionable. The arbitration clause is unconscionable if its
terms unreasonably favor one party or on a procedural basis. 141 In
cases where the clause is unreasonably favorable to one party, the
courts have found that one-sided unconscionable arbitration
clauses should not be enforced. The courts use both absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one party with unreasonably
favorable contract terms for the other party.142 Courts define uncon-
scionable as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party."' 43
Courts are especially vigilant if the contract appears to be a
contract of adhesion"44 Boilerplate language will trigger closer
examination of the contract and its parties. Courts abandon the
general rule of non-interference with contract agreements and
subject contracts of adhesion to higher scrutiny because the con-
tracts are considered both unfair and one-sided with little choice.
The standard used for testing the contract is "absence of meaning-
ful bargains." 145
Courts have used the following factors to determine if an
arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable:' 46 (1) gross dis-
parity of sophistication of the parties and business understanding;
(2) absence of reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of
the clauses; (3) absence of meaningful negotiation; (4) existence of
boilerplate language drafted by party in stronger bargaining posi-
tion; (5) contract terms not explained to party, nor even pointed out
to party; (6) consumer had feeling of helplessness, no meaningful
choice, take it or leave it contract basis; or (7) stronger party may
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have used deceptive practices to obscure terms of the contract.
Second, an arbitration clause may be found to be "fraud in
factum." Under contract theory, any contract procured by fraud is
void when there is a misrepresentation of its essential or material
terms.47 A manifestation of assent by the party is ineffective be-
cause the party believes he or she is agreeing to something else.
Likewise, a material misrepresentation is defined as a fact that
constitutes substantially the consideration of the contract, or with-
out which it would not have been made.148 Examples of fraud in
factum are: (1) a person unable to read who thinks they are signing
something else; (2) a person is told they have alternate forms of
recovery under the contract, which they do not, or they are not
informed at all; and (3) an unsophisticated party is told one thing,
but there is something different in the actual written language. 49
Third, the lack of mutuality may present an opportunity to
defeat an arbitration clause. Most of the arguments center on the
two forms of lack of mutuality discussed above under factors
disfavoring arbitration.150
Finally, a claim for fraudulent inducement by material mis-
representation may defeat an arbitration clause. This argument
focuses on the policy that the stronger party bears the burden and
obligation to point out unusual terms to the unsophisticated party.
The failure to disclose the unusual terms is a material misrepresen-
tation that voids the contract.''
VII. CASES HOLDING THAT THE MMWA PRECLUDES
THE FAA
The issue of binding arbitration clauses in consumer war-
ranty cases is highlighted by several recent Alabama cases. The
Alabama courts, including the federal district courts seated in
Alabama, have struggled with the preclusion issue for several
years. The courts have a history of considering the public policy of
the Constitution of Alabama in light of the Alabama legislature's
power to enact provisions that affect and regulate arbitration.
Alabama first enacted laws concerning arbitration in 1857 and then
again in 1923.111 However these statutes did not abrogate common
law procedures for dealing with arbitration agreements.'M The
1857 statute set up a procedure to allow a post-dispute arbitration
award to have the effect of a judgment, regardless of whether the
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parties consented. 15 Alabama has been pro-arbitration clause
enforcement to the extent that the courts have relied on common
law that considers both pre- and post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments valid. 56 However, Alabama also enforces the common law
that says the power to revoke an agreement to arbitrate always
remains with the parties. 57
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,158 the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts Alabama statutory law and ren-
ders specifically enforceable a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
contained in a contract that involves interstate commerce as op-
posed to common law, Alabama statutory law and public policy.5 9
Justice O'Connor commented on the application of the FAA to state
courts, when she said "I continue to believe that Congress never
intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state courts, and
that this Court has strayed far afield in giving the Act so broad a
compass." 160
The U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken on the effect the
MMWA preclusion of arbitration has had on the FAA's enforcement
of arbitration clauses.161 Additionally, states other than Alabama
have not addressed the issue as thoroughly. However, in light of
the present conflict in the Alabama decisions, other states may look
to Alabama's analysis of the issue for background and guidance.
Further, states may draw their own conclusions based on their
respective state constitutions, legislative authority and state public
policy.
In 1997, the court in Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc. found that
the MMWA superceded the FAA and denied a motion to compel
arbitration.62 In Waverlee Homes, the purchasers of a mobile home
brought an action in Alabama State court for breach of implied and
express warranty claims and violation of the MMWA against a
nonsignatory to the installment contract, but manufacturer of the
mobile homes, Waverlee Homes, Inc. 163 Waverlee Homes, Inc.
moved the action to Federal District Court based on the federal
courts' concurrent original jurisdiction under MMWA64 Waverlee
sought to compel arbitration under the FAA and to stay the judicial
proceeding pending the court's ruling on the arbitration issue. 165
The issue in Waverlee Homes was whether a warrantor who is
a nonsignatory to a commercial installment sales and financing
contract containing an arbitration clause may use contract prin-
ciples, such as equitable estoppel, to apply the FAA and compel
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buyers complaining of breach of warranty to arbitrate their
claims.'66 The court acknowledged that an arbitration clause under
the FAA was a matter of consent, not coercion, and that the parties
are usually free to structure their contracts. 67 However, the court
first had to determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate
between the parties. Finding that the parties must manifest assent
to the bargain, the court determined that "an entity that is neither a
party to nor agent for nor beneficiary of the contract lacks standing
to compel arbitration." 168
Turning to the issue of preemption of FAA arbitration by the
MMWA, the court held that the language of the MMWA and its
regulations confirmed that Congress intended consumers to retain
full and unfettered access to the courts for the resolution of their
disputes.169 Acknowledging that the MMWA did provide for infor-
mal dispute settlement procedures, the court said that these proce-
dures were non-binding and are a "prerequisite, not a bar, to relief
in court."' 70 Although the court did not decide whether the
MMWA precludes waiver of judicial remedy for violation of the
rights of purchasers, the court found that, in the limited issue
before it, the enforcement of the specific binding arbitration clause
in the mobile home purchase contract would violate the MMWA. 171
The question that was not answered by the Waverlee Homes
court is whether the direct seller of the mobile home could have
enforced the binding arbitration clause in the contract against the
buyer, and whether that would be a violation of the MMWA. Inter-
estingly, the court concluded its opinion reiterating the policy
against binding arbitration for consumers in warranty contracts. 72
The court opined that if every manufacturer colluded with product
retailers to insert broad and all-inclusive arbitration clauses in
consumer contract, then the manufacturer and the retailer would be
able to avoid the strictures and edicts of the MMWA. 173
The Waverlee Homes decision was followed by several other
Alabama cases. In 1998, in Rhode v. E & T Investments, Inc., the U.S.
District Court held that the MMWA precluded arbitration between
the buyer-lessee of a manufactured home and the manufacturer on
the written or express warranty claims. 74 In Rhode, the buyer-
lessee sued the manufacturer of a mobile home for inter alia, breach
of contract and breach of warranty. 75 The manufacturer removed
the action to District Court and moved to compel arbitration based
on a clause in the contract for the sale of the mobile home.' 76
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The Rhode court found that the arbitration agreement at issue
was not an unconscionable contract of adhesion because the plain-
tiff failed to supply a well-supported claim to the court.177 The
court stated that contracts of adhesion were not ipso facto invalid.
However it did list reasons why an arbitration agreement could be
found unconscionable for reasons such as; the clause was unjust
and unreasonable under the FAA, the finding of an absence of
meaningful choice by one party, the presence of contractual terms
which are unreasonably favorable to one party, the finding of un-
equal bargaining power among the parties, and the presence of
oppressive, one-sided or patently unfair terms.178
In addressing whether the MMWA precluded arbitration
clauses, the court said "Itihe FAA's mandate that agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims must be enforced, may be overridden by a
statute evincing a contrary congressional mandate." 179 Citing the
Waverlee Homes decision, the court concluded that under the
MMWA, Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration of
written or express warranty claims arising under the FAA. 8
In January 1999, the courts reaffirmed Waverlee Homes in
Southern Energy Homes, Inc., v. Lee 18 and In re Knepp.1 82 In Southern
Energy, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that, under the
MMWA, arbitration clauses were not enforceable against consum-
ers.183 Southern Energy involved a dispute between consumers and
manufacturers with the manufacturers moving for compelled
arbitration.M Distinguishing Waverlee Homes as between a con-
sumer and nonsignatory to a contract from the issue before the
court where the dispute was between signatories to the contract,
the court extended MMWA to preclude binding arbitration between
the manufacturer-warrantor and the consumer.8 5 The court based
its reasoning on the public policy of prohibiting a mechanism such
as arbitration from barring a consumer from their right to court
action. 186
In In re Knepp, the Alabama Bankruptcy Court found that
debtors who had filed an adversary complaint for fraud and civil
conspiracy against a creditor that financed the purchase of their car
were not compelled to arbitrate following a clause in the purchase
contract of the vehicle. 87 The Knepp court found that the arbitration
agreement was covered by federal law and was neither valid nor
enforceable. It also found that even if the arbitration clause was
enforceable, that it was void under the doctrine of unconscionabil-
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However, one case in 1997, Ex parte Isbell, both supported
arbitration and precluded arbitration. 189 Isbell involved a buyer
who brought breach of contract, warranty negligence and fraud
claims against the manufacturer of the home, as well as the seller
and the seller's agent.190 On a writ of mandamus, the Supreme
Court of Alabama found that although arbitration provisions of a
retail installment contract between buyers and sellers was not
unconscionable, the nonsignatory manufacturer could not rely on
the arbitration clause. 191
Isbell supports arbitration in that the court found that arbi-
tration clauses could be enforced in consumer contracts when the
contract is not a contract of adhesion.92 The plaintiff had claimed
that the provision in the contract, which allowed the seller-assignee
to seek judicial relief while they were forced into arbitration, was
unconscionable due to lack of mutuality of remedy.193 The court
said that in order to maintain a cause of action for unconscionabil-
ity, evidence must be presented to the court showing a foundation
of a contract of adhesion.9 Since the plaintiffs had not fulfilled
their burden of proof, the court did not address the question of
unconscionability.' 95
The Isbell decision, however, excluded the enforcement of
arbitration clauses when the nonsignatory such as a manufacturer
tries to enforce the clause against a consumer.'96 The defendant
claimed third party beneficiary and implied privity of contract. 97
In rejecting the defendant's claims, the Isbell court relied on
Waverlee Homes using the contract principle that nonsignatories to
the agreement have no enforcement rights as to the provisions of
the agreement. 98
Chief Justice Hooper's dissent opinion in Isbell provided an
alternative point of view."9 Justice Hooper related that legal status
of arbitration in Alabama was in a "state of flux.""' Stating that
there is nothing more fundamental than a contract dispute, the
language of the arbitration clause in the contract must be upheld as
it illustrates the intent of the parties.20 1 The dissent further distin-
guished the Waverlee Homes decision as only one federal district
court case upholding the preclusion of arbitration.2 2 Stating that
the defendant was within the relationship of the transaction, the
dissent questioned why the majority chose to ignore the weight of
authority from the federal circuit courts of appeals favoring arbitra-
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tion enforcement by a nonsignatory in close relationships with the
signatories.2 °3
VIII. CASES WHICH UPHELD FAA ARBITRATION OVER
THE MMWA
The District Court in Alabama carved out an exception to
MMWA preemption of arbitration under the FAA in Boyd v. Homes
of Legend, Inc. 4 In Boyd, the court held that binding arbitration
clauses under the FAA could be enforced for non-written and
implied warranty claims and were not precluded by the MMWA.2 11
Boyd involved multiple disputes over the warranties on
mobile home sales. The purchase installment contracts contained
clauses for binding arbitration of disputes. 20' The manufacturer
was not a signatory to the purchase contracts, only the buyers and
the retailer.2 7 The buyers sued for breach of express, non-written
and implied warranties. 208 The manufacturer, Homes of Legend,
Inc., sought to compel arbitration. 21 In its opinion, the court reiter-
ated that following Waverlee Homes, a nonsignatory to a purchase
contract could not compel arbitration as to the manufacturer.210
However, the court refused to extend the Waverlee Homes
decision of the MMWA precluding arbitration under the FAA to the
dealer, who was a signatory to the contract and did not provide any
written warranty to the buyer.211 The Boyd court reasoned that
although the Supreme Court had said the FAA could be overridden
by MMWA, the burden was on the party opposing arbitration to
show that Congress intended to make an exception to the FAA's
mandate for claims arising under the MMWA.212
The court found that Waverlee Homes did not apply because
Waverlee involved a written warranty and that the MMWA only
applies to written, not implied warranties.213 Since the dealer had
not given the buyer any specific written warranties, the court found
that only those provisions of MMWA directed at implied or general
warranties applied, but not the provisions of the MMWA which
were directed to the written warranties.1 The court concluded
that the MMWA "is exclusively in the context of written warranties,
and then solely with respect to informal mechanisms of dispute
resolution ... that Congress sought to limit recourse to binding
arbitration." 215
The court also relied on the public policy of the MMWA to
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protect consumers from unfair written warranties.216 The Boyd
court further distinguished written from non-written warranties.
The court agreed that written warranties are subject to the MMWA
and would preclude binding arbitration under the FAA because
they are the product of potentially unequal bargaining between
consumers and powerful manufacturers.217 However, the court
found that non-written warranties were derived from the legisla-
tive and judicial processes that should protect the consumer and
were not derived from the potential unequal bargaining concerns
that were the focus of the MMWA.1 8
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of com-
pelled arbitration under the FAA in MS Dealer Service Corp. v.
Franklin.21 9 The court found the Boyd court's holding persuasive as
to allowing a nonsignatory party to enforce an arbitration clause in
the sales contract.220 Although the issue in MS Dealer did not
involve a claim for breach of warranty and MMWA, in holding that
the arbitration clause could be enforced, the Eleventh Circuit sup-
ported the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements
and intentions of the parties to generously construe issues of
arbitrability, even in consumer contracts.22'
IV. CONCLUSION AND COMMENT
Does the MMWA go far enough to really protect consumers?
While the MMWA does not do much in the area of substantive
regulation of warranties, what it does has proved to be very valu-
able to consumers.222 However it may be concluded that it is not
enough dispute resolution protection, especially in light of the
court trend to liberally enforce arbitration clauses. This liberal
enforcement seems to be growing in scope following the Isbell
decision that arbitration clauses are enforceable in consumer con-
tracts when the parties are both signatories to the contract. Most of
the court arguments for arbitration are based on the "four-corners
of the contract"-the traditional method of contract interpretation.
The public policy of enforcing contract provisions is a time-honored
tradition of refusal by the courts to "interfere" with the parties'
agreed terms and intent.
Under the traditional view, it would go against the grain of
the courts to interject their own interpretation of the contract, and
remove a provision. Thus, under the traditional analysis method,
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the courts will not interfere and an arbitration agreement remains
enforceable. This view is supported by the Federal Arbitration Act
that has declared all arbitration clauses enforceable, and a continu-
ing pro-arbitration policy in the courts.
Perhaps the problem with the traditional view is that it
originated in a time when contracting was a different reality, i.e.,
two parties in face-to-face negotiation and bargained-for agree-
ments. Consumer contracts in today's marketplace are hardly two
parties, face-to-face and bargained-for agreements. The consumer
cry is justified. No one bargained for these clauses, including the
arbitration clauses. And laughably, if the consumer does not agree
to the clauses, the consumer cannot bargain for their elimination,
leaving a marketplace solution not to buy the product.
If the traditional view is one end of the spectrum, then
elimination of all arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, follow-
ing MMWA's lead in eliminating binding arbitration, is the other
end. In other words, traditional contract analysis should not apply
to consumer contracts, unless they are clearly "bargained-for"
exchanges, based on the understanding and acknowledgement of
the consumer party. If the consumer contracts are really contracts
of adhesion, then arbitration clauses should not be allowed or
should be voided by the courts.
Perhaps there is a middle ground position that might pro-
vide an equitable solution, that is, permit arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, but give the consumer better notice and pro-
vide some safeguards on the arbitral procedures. There appears to
be some movement to this middle ground position by consumer
lenders. In February 1999, the Practising Law Institute on Corpo-
rate Law published an article on arbitration clause drafting and
implementation guidelines.223 Noting that consumers are accus-
tomed to their remedy rights in court, the Kaplinsky article defined
the following practices to aid consumer lenders in communicating
arbitration clauses to the public. Changes which would create a
better arbitration clause for consumers: 224
1. Use clear concise language, following the "plain English" test,
enabling the consumer to understand they are signing an arbi-
tration clause within the contract;
2. Compel full disclosure by staff when communicating with the
consumer. Full disclosure would dispel unconscionable claims,
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the major source of attack on contract arbitration clauses. The
Kaplinsky article cautioned lenders that ambiguities are re-
solved against the drafter (lender, manufacturer), so that clarity
and full disclosure were beneficial to both parties.
In short, the Kaplinsky article suggested that warrantors should be
detailed enough to apprise consumers of their legal rights, disclose
the material aspects of the arbitration process, use language that is
clear, and be fair.225
In May 1998, the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee of the American Arbitration Association also recognized
a need for change in the arbitration of consumer contracts when it
published "A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration
of Consumer Disputes" ("AAA Protocol"). 226 In its Statement of
Principles, the AAA Protocol asserts that all parties are entitled to a
fundamentally-fair Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") pro-
cess. As embodiments of fundamental fairness, these Principles
should be observed in structuring ADR Programs. 27 The State-
ment continues, covering topics such as access to information;
independent and impartial neutrals (arbitrators); relief outside
arbitration in small claims courts; reasonable costs, locations, and
time limits; and right to representation. 228 The AAA Protocol
echoes the Practising Law Institute article in its guideline for infor-
mation to be given to consumers:
1. clear and adequate notice of the arbitration provision and its
consequences, including a statement of its mandatory or op-
tional character;
2. reasonable access to information regarding the arbitration
process, including basic distinctions between arbitration and
court proceedings, related costs, and advice as to where they
may obtain more complete information regarding arbitration
procedures and arbitrator rosters;
3. notice of the option to make use of applicable small claims court
procedures as an alternative to binding arbitration in appropri-
ate cases; and
4. a clear statement of the means by which the Consumer may
exercise the option (if any) to submit disputes to arbitration or
to court process.229
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As laudable as this attempt by the AAA is to address the
problems regardingcompelled arbitration in consumer contracts, it
raises several important issues. Since it is not federal nor state
statute but a "protocol", an uncertain portion of the consumer
market will follow the AAA's lead in changing their arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts. As demonstrated by the case law
above, currently, the only state that is avidly pursuing the con-
sumer contract arbitration issue is Alabama. Skeptically, one would
assume that more than a protocol is needed to effect any change in
industry. What may be needed is both more consumer litigation
challenging the arbitration clauses as well as subsequent state
legislative pressure to deter an industry from including arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.
Also, even if the AAA Protocol were somehow enforced, and
industry complied with the proposed changes, would the average
consumer understand that they are giving up their right to chal-
lenge any contract problem in court? The United States was
founded on the Constitutional right to have a "day in court. '230
From the time a consumer is in fourth grade civics class, they are
told they have a legal right which cannot be taken away from them,
and would assume especially that it would not be taken away in a
contract provision of which they were unaware. Arbitration, while
worthwhile in many contexts, does not fit into the public percep-
tion of the American justice system. Essentially, even if the con-
sumer understood that they were signing an arbitration clause,
would they believe that the government would allow their rights to
be so easily signed away.
Additionally, the AAA Protocol may have created a catch-22
for industry. The AAA rules may be specifically referred in a con-
sumer arbitration clause. One commentator has suggested that if
the clause cites the AAA rules then an arbitration clause may be
construed to be adopting the AAA Protocols, along with other AAA
regulations as a contractual matter.231 It is a matter of speculation
whether consumers can use the AAA Protocols as a benchmark to
test the fairness of an arbitral clause as it applies to consumers.
Three final thoughts on the arbitration controversy. First,
why not attack the clauses with the Uniform Commercial Code? As
one commentator observed, if the arbitration clause was not in the
original agreement, but in a subsequent agreement received after
the sale of the goods, then the arbitration contract should be voided
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by the Uniform Commercial Code.232 When the contract is not
between two merchants, such as a merchant and a consumer, UCC
Section 2-207 provides that if a party accepts a contract but also
states different or additional terms than were offered, those terms
are regarded as mere "proposals for addition" and not modifica-
tions to the contract.233 In light of the recent Gateway holding, this
may no longer be a viable argument.2 3 4
Second, an alternative resolution to the problem might be to
just compel the advertising of the arbitration clause in the advertis-
ing of the product. Compelled advertising is not new to laws
governing consumer protection and could be extended to cover an
arbitration clause. However, as in other areas, compelled advertis-
ing has become a myriad of jargon thrown at the consumer during
a 30 or 60-second commercial spot. Whether the consumer ever
hears or sees it all in that short of a time is questionable. Also, it is
doubtful that arbitration notices will ever be as significant on pack-
aging as "The Surgeon General's Warning" on cigarettes.
Third, does the "middle ground" really address the issue or
give the warrantor an out? Even if all the creditors, warrantors,
and manufacturers provide the consumer with better notice and
use procedural safeguards, what has really changed? The con-
sumer now has the "choice" of better arbitration, not litigation, and
is still faced with a contract of adhesion with improved, but not the
best consumer protection.
Arbitration under the FAA versus preclusion under the
MMWA is an unsettled area of law. Whether the clauses will ulti-
mately be upheld or voided is in the hands of the courts and state
legislatures and is based on public policies of fairness. However,
until the issue is settled either way, consumer advocates can take
some solace in the following warning given to industry at a Practis-
ing Law Institute workshop: Be aware that some jurisdictions have
a history of hostility where courts will strain to exclude arbitration
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